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1. INTRODUCTION
Tony Blair has produced a very useful review of forms of good premiss-conclusion
linkage other than deductive validity and inductive strength that have been recognized
and appropriated within the field of informal logic over the past 30 years. His paper will
be a useful reference.
I would like to begin my comments on his paper by registering my agreement
with the fundamentals of his approach. First, although Blair correctly distinguishes
reasoning from argument, he rightly notes that the novel forms of good linkage apply
equally well to both. The standards for good inference in one’s own reasoning seem to be
the same as the standards for good inference in arguments addressed to others, perhaps
because in both cases the question is the same: do the reasons that serve as the basis
transmit the appropriate kind of acceptability to the upshot? Second, at the highest level
of generality, the distinctions between induction, deduction and other forms of “duction”
are distinctions between different kinds of good linkage, not between different kinds of
reasoning or different kinds of argument. Reasoning and argument do not come labelled
as ‘deductive’ or ‘inductive’, and it is often a matter of decision by an evaluator which
standard of inference appraisal to apply, as Robert Ennis has recently argued (Ennis,
2001). At lower levels of generality, however, we are dealing with argument schemes or
reasoning schemes, such as inductive generalization, reasoning by analogy, conductive or
pros-and-cons reasoning, means-end reasoning, interpretation of a quoted passage,
inference to the best explanation, and so forth. (Walton, 1996) has presented a long list of
such argument schemes as appraisable by a presumptive or defeasible standard of
inference appraisal. But in fact some of these schemes have instances that meet a variety
of standards. An argument by analogy based on a tight determination relation, such as the
rule that the first letter of the postal code of a Canadian address determines the province
in which the address is located, has a conclusive inference. One based on a loose
determination relation, such as the causal relationship between various features of a house
and its current market value, has a non-conclusive inference, which in the case of a
competent real estate appraisal would support a judgment that the current market value of
the property being appraised is probably within a specified range. An argument by
parallels of the sort to which John Wisdom draws our attention in his Proof and
Explanation (Wisdom, 1991) creates in the best case a presumption that its conclusion is
to be accepted. Thus there is no single standard of inference appraisal appropriate to all
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arguments by analogy, if arguments by analogy are defined in the most general way as
arguments that project a queried property from analogue cases to a target on the basis of
properties that they are assumed to have in common. The same is true of other argument
schemes.
Having registered my agreement with Blair’s basic framework, except for the
caveat about argument schemes, I would like to lodge an objection to the presupposition
of his title, that informal logic has its own distinctive logic. As Blair himself has stated, in
a paper co-authored with Ralph Johnson, informal logic “is best understood as the
normative study of argument. It is the area of logic which seeks to develop standards,
criteria and procedures for the interpretation, evaluation and construction of arguments
and argumentation used in natural language.” (Blair & Johnson, 1987, p.148; similarly,
Johnson & Blair, 2000, p. 94) Blair’s present paper comes under the heading of standards
and criteria for the evaluation of arguments used in natural language. Such standards will
obviously include those developed in the logical tradition of the last 2,400 years. We
should not expect informal logic to ignore work already done on what constitutes a good
inference. Nor should we necessarily expect amendment or supplementation of this
tradition to come from scholars who identify themselves as members of the informal
logic community. In fact, of the six thinkers whose innovations Blair reviews, only one
considered himself to be working in the field of informal logic when he introduced his
innovation: Douglas Walton. And Walton’s work on presumptive reasoning, as he and
Blair acknowledge, is largely derivative from the work of Pollock and of artificial
intelligence researchers like Reiter on defeasible reasoning. Given this track record, we
should not expect research in the field of informal logic to produce innovations about
premiss-conclusion linkage. Nor should we expect it to develop proof systems for nonconclusive consequence relations, with accompanying metatheorems concerning the
soundness, completeness, decidability and other properties of such systems. There is a
need for such developments, but they are the business of formal logic, not of informal
logic.
Blair’s paper raises many interesting questions. I shall discuss only two of them.
First, how are we to classify the ways in which an upshot can be legitimately inferred
from a basis? Second, what can be said to supplement Blair’s brief characterization of
deductive validity and inductive strength?
2. KINDS OF “DUCTION”
Given the recognition in the logical tradition of deduction, induction, abduction and
conduction as distinct forms of legitimate inference, it is useful to coin the word ‘duction’
(from the Latin ductio, meaning ‘a leading’) as the name of the genus of which these
forms are species, or perhaps sub-species. As I shall use the word, a duction is a
legitimate way of inferring an upshot from a basis. If the neologism is opaque, one could
instead call the genus ‘followings’ and think of the species as ways of following.
How shall we divide the genus of duction or following?
We should not expect, I think, a tree of Porphyry, with a cut at each division into
a set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive species, proceeding steadily and
gracefully to the infimae species that cannot be further divided. For there are various
bases on which ductions can be divided, and these bases cut across one another. One
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basis of division is the formality or non-formality of the duction. A formal duction is a
way of following that can be brought under a rule of inference that is purely formal, in
the sense that its statement consists entirely of logical expressions. For example, formal
deductive validity, if defined with reference to a formal language, is the property of an
argument that it has no counter-model, i.e. no interpretation of its extra-logical constants
in which the basis is true and the upshot not true. (Formal validity can be defined for
natural-language arguments in terms of their symbolizability by a formally valid
argument in a formal language.) Note that not all formal ductions are deductive.
Inferences in accordance with Bayes’ theorem are formal but non-deductive. Non-formal
ductions cannot be brought under a formal rule of inference, but can be brought under
one that is material, in the sense that its statement contains at least one expression that is
not logical. In contemporary philosophical logic, material consequence seems to be
defined as a relationship dependent on the meaning of the basis and the upshot, as in such
simple examples as ‘Jones is a bachelor, so Jones is male’. But one can allow ductions in
which the non-formal generalization that licenses the inference is not a conceptual truth
but a substantive generalization, as in the argument ‘This object is made of wood, so it
will float in water’. In this example, the inference-licensing generalization that objects
made of wood float in water is a nomic (law-like) generalization that supports counterfactual conditionals (‘if this wooden object were put in water, it would float’). But even
purely accidental generalizations can license inferences; for example, it follows from the
fact that Abraham Lincoln was president of the United States that he was a man, since all
U.S. presidents to date have been men. But the counter-factual conditional that, if Walter
Mondale had been elected president of the United States in 1984 and had died in office,
being succeeded to the office by his vice-presidential running mate Geraldine Ferraro,
then Geraldine Ferraro would have been a man, is obviously false.
Another basis for distinguishing ductions, cutting across that according to their
formality or non-formality, has to do with their defeasibility status. Pollock, for example,
distinguishes conclusive ductions from defeasible ductions. On the usual understanding,
all inferences licensed by exceptionless generalizations—whether they are logical,
conceptual, nomic or accidental—are conclusive, and thus non-defeasible. But
connectionist scruples can generate kinds of conclusive duction that cannot be rebutted
(i.e. shown to be false in a way consistent with the truth of the premisses) but can be
undermined. According to one connectionist conception of conclusive duction
(Hitchcock, 1998), an upshot follows conclusively from a given basis if and only if there
is some general feature of the argument from the basis to the upshot rules out that the
basis is true while the upshot is not true, even though it does not rule out the basis is true
and does not rule out that the upshot is not true. The latter qualifications are designed to
rule out trivial ways of satisfying the requirement for conclusive duction, for example by
the basis having a general feature that rules out its truth (e.g. ‘Socrates is an immortal
human, so all wine is sweet’) or the upshot having a general feature that rules out its
falsehood (e.g. ‘Wine is wine, because Socrates was an Athenian’). A consequence of the
rejection of trivial conclusive duction is that additional information can undermine an
otherwise conclusive inference. For example, it follows from the premiss that a certain
tree is a pine that it is a conifer. But if one adds to the basis the additional information
that it is not a pine (thus producing an inconsistent database), the proposition that the tree
is a conifer no longer follows, for any general feature that rules out the basis is true while
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the upshot is not true also rules out that the basis is true. The new information of course
does not show that the conclusion is false; it merely undermines the inference. If we
recognize ductions that are conclusive but underminable, then the basic division along the
axis of defeasibility is between rebuttable and non-rebuttable ductions. A rebuttable
duction is subject to a rebutting (or, in Pinto’s happy phrase, “overriding”—Pinto, 2001,
pp. 102-103) defeater, a circumstance in which the basis remains true but the output is not
true. Rebuttable ductions are those for which it is appropriate to qualify the conclusion
with a word like ‘probably’, ‘presumably’ or ‘possibly’. We could thus divide rebuttable
ways of following into those that make the upshot probable given the truth of the basis,
those that create a presumption of its acceptability given the truth of the upshot, and those
that establish its worthiness to be given serious consideration given the truth of the
upshot. There might be other ways of following coordinate with these three, and each of
them might be divisible into sub-species.
3. DEDUCTION AND INDUCTION
Blair assumes that deductive validity and inductive strength are two ways in which an
illative move from some “basis” to its “upshot” can be good. But both these concepts are
more problematic than he acknowledges.
He glosses deductive validity, labeled as “entailment” of the upshot by the basis, as the
impossibility of the upshot’s being false if the basis is true. The gloss raises a number of
questions, which are independent of Blair’s additional requirement for a good deductive
illative move that the basis is different from the upshot. First, Blair’s gloss presupposes
that both the upshot and the basis are truth-bearers, but some recent work (e.g. Pinto,
2006; Ennis, 2006) has questioned this presupposition, and proposed instead that the
upshot is an entitlement with respect to a truth-bearer (or, in the case of reasoning, the
mental analogue of an illocutionary act which the reasoning entitles one to perform). If
this proposal is accepted, some modification to the conceptualization of deductive
validity will be required. Second, the gloss needs clarification of what meaning the word
‘if’ has in this context. If it is construed truth-functionally, then it follows that any illative
move to an upshot that cannot be false is a good one, for example, the move from ‘Pluto
is a planet’ to ‘2 + 2 = 4’. It also follows that any illative move from a basis that cannot
be true is a good one, for example, the move from ‘you are sitting and you are not sitting’
to ‘Tom is in the corner’. There is a long history of skepticism about whether such illative
moves from a completely irrelevant basis are really good, skepticism that has produced
for example the work of C. I. Lewis on strict implication (Lewis, 1918, 1920) Anderson
and Belnap’s conceptualization of relevant entailment (Anderson & Belnap, 1975;
Anderson, Belnap, & Dunn, 1992), and Neil Tennant’s classical and intuitionist relevant
logics (Tennant, 1987). Relevantists (e.g. Read, 1988) tend to describe entailment as the
impossibility of the upshot’s being false while the basis is true. Third, the gloss needs
clarification of what sort of impossibility is intended. If it is logical impossibility, then
some clarification of what constitutes logical impossibility is required. If deductive
validity is to include not just logical or formal validity but also what some have called
‘semantic validity’ or ‘material validity’ (Brandom, 1998, 2001), then a broader sense of
impossibility is needed. One way to clarify this sense is to appeal to the meaning of the
basis and the upshot (assuming that these are linguistic items, not the semantic correlates
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of linguistic items) as that which rules out the situation that the basis is true and the
upshot false. Such a clarification gives rise to further difficulties in determining what
counts as part of the meaning and what counts as a substantive claim—for example,
whether ‘water’ by definition means a chemical compound whose molecules each consist
of two atoms of hydrogen and one atom of oxygen. One could accommodate all three of
the concerns that I have just mentioned by rephrasing Blair’s gloss on the concept of
deductive validity as follows: the meaning of the basis and the upshot rules out in a nontrivial way that the truth-bearing content of the basis is true while the truth-bearing
content of the upshot false. In this gloss, the phrase ‘in a non-trivial way’ needs further
explication. If the meaning of the basis does not rule out that its truth-bearing content is
true and the meaning of the upshot does not rule out that its truth-bearing content is false,
then non-triviality is guaranteed. A more complicated explication is needed to allow for
relevant deduction from a basis whose truth-bearing content cannot be true or to an
upshot whose truth-bearing content cannot be false. A fourth question about Blair’s gloss
concerns illative moves where the upshot or basis does not involve a commitment to the
truth of a truth-bearer, for example moves from a conditional command and the
satisfaction of its condition to an unconditional command. Such moves can perhaps be
brought under a general conception of entailment by considering their alethic analogues,
such as the move from a conditional ought statement and the satisfaction of its condition
to an unconditional ought statement.
As to inductive strength, Blair glosses this as “the quantifiable degree that the basis
makes it probable that the upshot is true or worthy of acceptance”. This gloss avoids
many of the problems of his gloss of deductive validity. The phrase “makes it probable”
rules out trivial satisfaction of the definition by the upshot’s being probable
independently of the basis or by the basis being improbable. In contrast to the concept of
impossibility, the concept of probability does not require specification. Further, the
addition of the phrase “or worthy of acceptance” allows for upshots that do not involve
commitment to the truth of a truth-bearer. In cases where there is such a commitment, the
possibility that the basis or upshot is not a truth-bearer can be handled by talking about
their truth-bearing content, as with deductive validity. There are however new difficulties
with conceptualizing inductive strength. First, the probability of an upshot given a basis is
always relative to background information, which should in principle be specifiable. For
example, in playing bridge the probability that one’s right-hand opponent has the king of
a certain suit given that it is in neither one’s own nor one’s partner’s hand is 0.5 in the
absence of further relevant information, but close to 1 if the opposing team has only 12
high-card points between them and one’s right-hand opponent made an opening bid,
which usually means at least 12 high-card points. To accommodate this relativity, Carnap
proposed that, “in the application of inductive logic to a given situation, the total
evidence available must be taken as a basis for determining the degree of confirmation.”
(Carnap, 1962, p. 211) The interpretation and rationale of Carnap’s so-called “total
evidence requirement” are a matter of ongoing controversy (see for example McLaughlin,
1970), but some acknowledgement of relativity to background information is a
requirement of any adequate conception of an inductively good inference. Second, many
of the forms of reasoning and argument that are standardly taken to be appraisable in
terms of inductive strength (universal generalization, statistical generalization, inductive
extrapolation) cannot be assigned a quantitative degree to which the basis makes the
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upshot probable, unless there is additional background information. Thus, one cannot
compute any definite degree to which a generalization or extrapolation is made probable
by the observed uniformity in some respect of a proper subset of some class of objects
(such as marbles in a jar), unless one has further background information or makes
further assumptions (Hitchcock, 1999). And, notoriously, techniques of statistical
inference allow one to compute the margin of error around the frequency of occurrence of
a property within a certain “universe” or “population” within which there is a probability
of .95 (“19 times out of 20”) that the frequency of a property in a sample of specified size
randomly selected from it will occur, but one cannot compute from the observed sample
frequency any definite probability that the population frequency will be within some
specified interval around it. Bayes’ theorem, which is at the heart of inductive logic, is
mathematically unassailable, given its assumptions, but applying the theorem requires a
prior probability of the upshot and prior and posterior likelihoods of the basis, numbers
that in most real-life situations we do not know.
A further complication of Blair’s initial claim that deductive validity (combined with a
difference between the upshot and the basis) and inductive strength make for illative
goodness is that these properties, however they are glossed, are insufficient. If a basis
entails an upshot distinct from it, but it is completely unclear that it does so, then the
illative move from the basis to the upshot is not good. To take an example from
arithmetic, we know that the Peano axioms in second-order logic completely characterize
the natural numbers 0, 1, 2 and so on—in the sense that any property of the natural
numbers that can be stated in the vocabulary of those axioms follows necessarily from
them. Hence, if Goldbach’s conjecture is true, that every even number is the sum of two
prime numbers, then there is a deductively valid move from the Peano axioms as basis to
Goldbach’s conjecture as upshot. Similarly, if Goldbach’s conjecture is false, then there
is a deductively valid move from the Peano axioms as basis to the denial of Goldbach’s
conjecture as upshot. But at present nobody knows whether Goldbach’s conjecture is true
or false—mathematicians have not yet solved this problem, despite more than 250 years
of trying (with a million-dollar prize on offer during two of those years). A proof of
Goldbach’s conjecture or its denial must not only involve deductively valid reasoning
from the axioms of arithmetic to the theorem, but must involve steps that human
reasoners know are deductively valid. (A complication of this example is that, since any
consistent second-order logic is incomplete, the logic being used to prove the theorem
may not permit one to deduce it from the axioms, even though in fact it follows from
them.) The same point can be made about inductively strong inferences. (Hamblin, 1970)
expressed the point as the requirement that an upshot follow “reasonably immediately”
and “clearly” from its basis. But this requirement is not the end of the story, because there
is no well-established general account of when a deductive or inductive link between
basis and upshot is reasonably immediate and clear. In a system of deductive or inductive
logic, there are basic rules of inference, and one can stipulate that an inference in a proof
within that system is good if and only if it is in accordance with those basic rules, or with
derived rules that have been established in the development of the system. Generalization
on this special type of situation leads one to the dialectical criterion of linkage adequacy
that Hamblin ended up endorsing: “The passage from premisses to conclusion must be of
an accepted kind.” (Hamblin, 1970, p. 245) If we adopt this dialectical framework, then
we can interpret Blair’s critical review of the informal logic literature as an inquiry into
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what kinds of “passage” that are neither deductively valid nor inductively strong we
informal logicians accept (or at least are being encouraged by our peers to accept).
4. CONCLUSION
To sum up, Blair has given us an extremely valuable overview of post-war proposals for
acceptable types of linkage that are neither deductively valid nor inductively strong. As
far as I can tell, his summary is quite accurate. One notable omission is the set of
argumentative schemes extracted by Chaim Perelman and Lucie Obrechts-Tyteca
(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958) from the rhetorical, philosophical and literary
tradition of European civilization.
I have endorsed Blair’s view that the types of duction are the same for reasoning
and for argument, and that at the highest level of generality we are in fact dealing with
kinds of legitimate inference, or standards of inference appraisal, rather than with kinds
of reasoning or kinds of argument. But at lower levels of generality, I have claimed, the
levels where talk of ‘argument schemes’ or ‘reasoning schemes’ is appropriate, we are
dealing with kinds of reasoning or argument, kinds whose appropriate standard of
inference appraisal may in fact vary from one instance to another. I have also registered
my disagreement with the presupposition of the title of Blair’s paper that informal logic
has its own distinctive logic. I proposed the term ‘duction’ as a generic term for all
legitimate kinds of inference, taking advantage of the existing use of the terms
‘deduction’, ‘induction’, ‘abduction’ and ‘conduction’ for specific kinds of legitimate
inference. I argued that ductions cannot be classified in a Poprhyrian genus-species tree,
but fall into a matrix structure, with their division according to the formality or type of
non-formality of the inference cutting across their division according to their rebuttability
or non-rebuttability. I then elaborated at some length on the commonly accepted forms of
legitimate inference, deduction and induction, arguing that what constituted a legitimate
deduction and what constituted a legitimate induction was more complicated than Blair’s
brief description acknowledged.
There is much more to be said about the specifics of the forms of inference
recognized and discussed in Blair’s very useful review and comparison.
link to response
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